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ABSTRACT
The relationship between the European Union (EU) and its member states have been characterized by 
many signiﬁcant changes when the impact of the Euroscepticism started to mark its presence in the number of 
countries, founding members of the European Union. The author will try to analyze the Eurosceptic develop-
ments in Italy in the last years, with a particular focus on the 2018 when the new “yellow-green” government 
coalition was formed. The unpredictable results waving to the anti-establishment political elites coming to 
power demonstrate that the shifts in “national lenses” started to be a trend with unpredictable results not only 
for Italy, but for the whole EU. By analyzing the wide-range levels of Euroscepticism, the author will try to 
reveal how the multi-faceted concept of Euroscepticism casts shades on the European integration project.
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INTRODUCTION
The arc of contemporary politics bends towards delusion because the so-called 
politically “dark forces” of world politics – nationalism, territorial revision, illiberal-
ism – are reasserting themselves as vital voices making an impact for the governments 
to change their behavior in addressing the challenges. As a result, the nations are 
rethinking about the European project as well, expanding the grounds for Euroscep-
ticism and populism to be strong.
The turning point in this respect was 2014 when the European Parliament re-
ceived a new impetus of Eurosceptic representatives coming to power. Apart from 
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UK Independence Party and Front Nationale (France), there appeared to be the 
representatives of Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle, M5S) and (Northern) 
League (Lega) from Italy. Moreover, at the national level in Italy since June 2018, 
new rules of procedure are changing the spectrum of the country from genuinely 
Euro-optimistic to Eurosceptic interlinked with the proposed budget rules to the EU.
The relevance of this topic lies from the need to shape the new populism in Eu-
rope overwhelming EU member states’ decision-making and not trajectoring much 
towards the European integration project. In this respect, Italy presents a unique case 
combining not only populistic trends but also uniting them with the Eurosceptic de-
cision from the newly formed “yellow-green” government. This paper aims to show 
how the elements of populism and Euroscepticism are interlinked in what concerns 
Italian ruling coalition since June 2018. This paper is structured into four parts. In the 
ﬁrst section, a theoretical reflection on the concepts of Euroscepticism is provided to 
individuate the dimensions common to the two phenomena. The second section tells 
about the shift in the Italian discourse from Euro-optimism to Euro-scepticism in 
particular after Matteo Renzi’s referendum in 2016. The third and fourth sections are 
dedicated to clarifying the research questions: 1) In what way is the Italian populism 
and Euroscepticism different?; 2) What implications does this hybrid combination 
of populism and Euroscepticism put on the position of Italy towards the European 
integration project, in particular, relevant before the European parliamentary elections 
in 2019 and after 100 days of yellow-green governance?
The novelty of this research paper is about to try to summarize the Italian pop-
ulism upheaval corresponding to the “yellow-green” governance and Eurosceptic 
trends in decision-making. The primary source of the research paper was the gov-
ernmental program of yellow-green government composed by the League and Five 
Star Movement in June 2018 as well as some legal, governmental acts. Moreover, 
we use the political parties programs (with the focus on the League and Five Star 
Movement) to summarize the points related to the issues of the EU, economy, and 
migration. The secondary sources of the paper measure the attractiveness of the 
governmental decisions in what concerns sensitive issues to Italians: budget talks, 
migration challenges, and social spending. The methodology of the paper includes 
a desk study of documents and publications from most primary and secondary sources 
helping to evaluate a study’s overall validity and reliability critically.
The article ends up with reflections on further research studies. Based on the 
collection of single-country and comparative member-states studies, we formulated 
our conclusions revealing the grounds for Italian populist Euroscepticism and proved 
the hypothesis.
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EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND EUROPEAN SKEPTICISM
European integration became mainstream for the majority of the countries of the 
EU especially in the last decade. However, the grounds were strong enough even in 
1991. That time, encompassing domestic and foreign challenges, the European Union 
was an innovative crafting model aimed at incubating sustainability, prosperity and 
sharing common values. The diverse voices to interpret the Maastricht Treaty, its 
content and implementation, led to the ﬁrst waves of Eurosceptic approaches. Due 
to the multifaceted challenges, nations feared to lose national sovereignty as well as 
national identity especially when the European citizenship project turned to be real 
[Verney 2011: 1–2]. In reality, the implementation process of the Maastricht Treaty 
entered into the period of elections, party competitions, and referendums.
Such transformation in the European Union prompted the scholars to be focused 
on various aspects within Euroscepticism interpretation. In general, Euroscepticism 
as a phenomenon is being understood as skepticism towards the process of the dis-
approval concerning one or some European Union policies. 
One of the conventional explanation for Euroscepticism was related to the EU 
democratic deﬁcit existence. It means that EU decision-making process was far from 
the aware citizen model when citizens were able to present their voices. It is necessary 
to admit that, as a political phenomenon, Euroscepticism received a limited level of 
interest till recent times. In this regard, some of the scholars, like Paul Taggart and 
Aleks Szczerbiak, tried to conceptualize Euroscepticism with its all-encompassing 
approach by contrasting “hard Euroscepticism” and “soft Euroscepticism”. In this 
respect, “the hard” one is labeled as opposition to the European integration process 
and the EU, whereas its “soft” version presented an idea of disapproval towards one 
or several EU policies [Taggart, Szczerbiak 2004: 1–27].
In a more deﬁned way, Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde vary from Europhiles to 
Europhobes in analyzing the approaches to the European integration and the Euro-
pean Union itself. They present the supporters of the EU and European integration 
as Euroenthusiasts. Europragmatists become those who are willing to support the EU 
as such generally; and then there are Eurosceptics, i.e. those who generally support 
the ideas of the European integration but somewhat express negative opinions about 
the EU. Finally, the classiﬁcation presents Eurorejects. They subscribe neither to the 
ideas underlying the process of European integration nor to the EU itself [Kopecký, 
Mudde 2002: 302–303].
A bit broader perspective was presented by Chris Flood in his six-point cate-
gorization of Euroscepticism. On the one hand, he gives “maximalists” reflecting 
positively on the process of further European integration. On the other hand, there 
are rejectionists, totally opposing EU membership and participation in EU processes. 
There are also “revisionists”, trying to return to the status quo before the integration 
project times; “minimalists” who have a rather positive attitude towards EU achieve-
ments but negative towards the new waves of integration; “gradualists”, advocating 
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for the slow-speed integration; and “reformists”, attempting to improve the existing 
EU developments [Flood 2002: 46].
However, these theoretical approaches could not explain why the tendencies of 
the EU center and periphery diversity made even a more signiﬁcant impact than the 
economic crisis in 2008. In reality, coinciding with migration challenges, the moti-
vations to use the EU institutions to advocate for proper interests is what becomes 
realistic nowadays. Therefore, some of the scholars tried to go beyond the traditional 
way of interpreting Euroscepticism. Eugenio Salvati argues that contemporary Euro-
sceptic opinions might be very much linked to the idea of populism in EU countries. 
In such a way, political parties of the member states manifest their unwillingness to 
consider the European Union as a political actor, since it is “the product of non-rec-
ognized political system” [Salvati 2016].
Moreover, Catherine De Vries presents a new cutting-edge approach towards 
how public opinion matters in understanding the EU and European integration. In 
her book, she dwells on multi-facet Euroscepticism which can target the European 
integration process depending on how national institutions and policies respond to 
citizen’s views of the EU. She breaks the conventional idea that Euroscepticism is 
a mono-conceptualized response [De Vries 2018: 26–28].
In this regard, Liubomir Topaloff makes a conclusion about national political 
actors regarding their decision-making that tends to adopt rather an anti-EU position 
than the pro-EU one instead. According to this scholar, political elites believe that 
current EU modus operandi is not conﬁdent enough for the current depth of inte-
gration to be satisfactory. In such a way, he stipulates that too much or too less EU 
integration prompts nations and political elites consider it as a variable that tends to 
go further on the negative curve [Topaloff 2012: 23–24].
ITALY’S PATH FROM EURO-OPTIMISM TOWARDS EUROSCEPTICISM
Italy’s participation in the development of the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, 
the conduct of all intergovernmental conferences, namely during the Italian pres-
idency in the EU, concluded with the signing of the necessary treaties of the EU 
(Maastricht and Amsterdam), identiﬁed the critical role and place of this country in 
shaping European politics in the early 1990s.
These treaties included not only the completion of the creation of a common 
internal market; monetary, economic, and customs unions; monetary, political integra-
tion; and the creation of a military-political alliance. Besides, it was about preparing 
for the processes of deepening and expanding European integration and the EU as 
a whole [Vdovychenko 2013: 79]. The principles of deep integration laid down by 
the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties are subject to numerous discussions at the 
beginning of the 21st century. However, it was the Italians themselves who remained 
the largest Euro-optimists in the EU.
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The historical connection between Italy and Europe has always determined the 
priority of pro-European affairs over national issues. Within Italy’s case, it is stip-
ulated that the Italians not only appraise the EU through national lenses, but also 
analyze the local achievements through the prism of European developments [De 
Vries 2018: 28].
Italy’s national transformations at the beginning of the 1990s, leading to the 
establishment of the Second Republic, prompted newly-born parties to elaborate 
new approaches towards EU institutions and European integration as a process. 
Thus, since the advent of the Second Republic governance, a new chain of politi-
cians announced a change in the governing system towards more responsiveness 
to post-Maastricht Treaty challenges. Moreover, considered as a Euro-enthusiastic 
nation, Italians perceived the process of European integration rather as a “political 
beneﬁt” for Italian society. Both geopolitical interests and outcomes from being in 
the EU explained the support of the EU integration processes. Italians presented 
quite positive approaches towards the European integration process in before- and 
after-Maastricht treaty years [Vdovychenko 2012: 28]. This approach was based on 
a straightforward logic: holding a somewhat negative perspective of national elites, 
the Italians considered European institutions more powerful to implement effective 
policies and receive proper responses.
In recent years, the EU crisis and austerity measures introduced were prompting 
to “uncork the bottle” of the Eurosceptic front, leading to the emergence of new 
parties that are opposed to the process of integration.The point of no return for Italy 
were European parliamentary elections in 2014 and consequent national voting in the 
Matteo Renzi’s referendum on December 4, 2016. Euroscepticism became common 
ground to surge due to the emergence of a new dimension of political competition 
in Italy and the EU. Moreover, shadows of “external forces” including migration 
and asylum crisis in 2015 raised serious concerns over EU’s ability to effectively 
respond to the prevailing political issues [Mauro, Memoli 2016: 32–33]. In the UK, 
Brexit opened the “Pandora box” to reflect about EU prolonged legitimacy crisis.
Even in 2018, Italian politicians and scholars are polarizing around two further di-
rections of the European Union’s development, in particular: through further and deeper 
integration or, conversely, disintegration, that is, the weakening of existing ties between 
EU member states in certain spheres. Prime minister of Italy, Paolo Gentiloni spoke on 
the importance of further integration in 2015, during the conference organized by the 
Italian Institute for International Political Studies. He noted that the future of Europe 
would depend on the ability of States-states to regenerate interactions and the desire 
to overcome the frustration associated with the slower pace of European integration 
[Gentiloni e Gozi in ISPI: il ruolo dell’Italia nel future dell’Ue 2015].
At the same time, the evolutionary changes in EU countries with a multi-party 
system of governance began even earlier. Accordingly, Italy, one of the founding 
fathers of the EU, felt the unprecedented growth of non-systemic political forces 
formed into populist movements. In addition, populism in the Italian Republic was 
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also referred to as “national”, since the Italian political circles began to favor the 
idea of gradual disintegration and the weakening of relations with Europe [Lanzone, 
Woods 2015: 56].
The national governmental challenges affected most the Italian mindset to raise 
concerns about the systemic inefﬁciencies that Italy produced for its citizens. The 
legislative measure to drive democracy towards a more majoritarian model produced 
even more disappointment. Moreover, the fact of being incapable of changing power 
in order to govern more efﬁciently, made Italians think that the shift to the Second 
Republic was a pure illusion [Marangoni 2013: 108]. Thus, frequent intergovernmen-
tal conflicts and disputes showed the incapacity for the Italian politicians to deliver 
grass-root challenges not only to the national but also to the European institutions.
As for the external challenges for Italy at the beginning of the 21st century, it is 
necessary to consider the feeling of being vulnerable and inflexible to new global-
ization challenges. Taking into consideration the global crisis, the Italian Republic 
remains the leading economy in the world and the third largest economy of the Eu-
rozone. Unlike other states in the Mediterranean region, its economy is somewhat 
diversiﬁed, which gives it the preference to adapt, albeit not immediately, to the 
economic challenges of the EU. The political salience of becoming pro-European 
as a backbone for the country development and identity is presented in the study by 
Fabio Serricchio. He tries to demonstrate the changing variable that impacts on how 
nations attribute themselves to the EU, European integration process and its future 
[Serricchio 2012: 117–118]. In such a way, he measures to explain the growing 
sense of why Italians are increasing their disaffection towards European integration.
In this regard, it is necessary to draw a line between Euroscepticism and popu-
lism. Flavio Chiapponi [2008] present several features of populist engagement into 
the process, merely a desire to have strong leadership to overcome existing economic, 
social and political issues as well as the demonstrative intolerance to the existing 
institutions. Moreover, this political scientist present the idea that personalization of 
populism is the outcome of the simpliﬁcation of the populist rhetoric trying to offer 
the answers to all the challenges.
The populist mentality reflects its “black-and-white logic”: from realistic ideas of 
people to more idealized, from perceiving the realities of current political, economic 
and social challenges per se as basic points towards an open aversion to the existing 
challenges and intolerance towards institutional means to address them. Special 
to Italian case remains a greater variety of this way of thinking, presenting rather 
a chameleonic character attributed to speciﬁcally Italian populism used by both right 
and left political parties . Therefore, it is quite clear why Italian populists also attack 
the mechanisms of direct democracy. Aversion to national or EU institutions, which 
have not committed themselves to following the nations’ will, and far distance from 
people, made populists demand that the political decision-making process stands 
for the people’s will. At the same time, it is an interesting observation that populists 
use the critique of the democratic institutions not to deny the democratic principles. 
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They would rather reestablish their populist narratives to compensate an increasing 
demand for democratization between institutions and citizens and in such a way 
paying more and more attention to the issue of Euroscepticism in Italy.
Following the logic of Topaloff, both national and EU political parties are the 
primary driver of policies and politics in European democratic systems. The scholar 
considers them as the most critical challenges of spreading Eurosceptic agenda [To-
paloff 2012: 5]. It is a highly contentious topic whether economic problems fostered 
the spread of populism and skepticism in Italy. However, we expect that the ideo-
logical proﬁle of the Italian Eurosceptic parties determines a particular approach in 
reflecting over the EU. Therefore, we formulate a hypothesis (H1a) that the populist 
parties in Italy, being linked to the governing right-wing rhetoric, prefer to have 
a more radical approach towards the structures of the EU, putting under pressure 
the principles of its governance; (H1b) Left-wing populist parties tend to criticize 
the EU as well, but not its governing principles.
A more elaborate study should examine the speciﬁc conditions that prompt Italian 
political “elites” to open their anti-EU rhetoric. The Italian manifestation targeting 
the European integration issues rose due to their populist anti-EU point of view, 
gaining more positions in the governments. However, the economic challenges were 
the ﬁrst for the Italian citizens to raise concerns about EU policies implementation in 
their country. Being low-productive and low-growth scale country before the crisis, 
in 2008 Italy became among “the biggest among the weakest” member states with 
enormous debt-to-ratio GDP of 102.4% [Country Economy Debt: Italy National 
Debt 2008] an increasing level of unemployment, especially among young people, 
it fostered inequality, and social changes made an impact on the party systems and 
their narratives. At the same time, having a multiparty system, Italy immediately 
received messages from its society to penalize the existing political authorities 
[Toygur 2018: 1–2].
Another point of view in favor of Eurosceptic agenda is the fact that economic 
beneﬁts became a pivotal determinant for the citizens to orient their approaches in 
support or not towards European integration. Evis Mezini stipulates that citizens ana-
lyze their cost-beneﬁt trade-off related to their welfare gains and losses and associate 
them with the EU efﬁciency [Mezini 2014: 19–20]. Starting from the times of Mario 
Monti being the prime minister of Italy, his austerity measures were supported in 
Germany and France but failed to be understood by the Italians. The ﬁgures about 
the Italians’ trust in the EU, and political parties reached its lowest point in the period 
of 2012–2014 [Toygur 2018: 5–6]. At the same time, the “Achilles heel” in Italy still 
remains to be good governance and public administration due to its historic legacy. 
Starting from the 1990s, for the third decade, Italy is experiencing a “reform path”, 
when the need for effective reforms has numerous political and economic barriers. 
It is possible to agree with an Italian scholar Andrea Pirro that Italy is having its 
unique form of populism – polyvalent populism, which combines supporting nu-
merous ideological discordances, newness, and radicalness [Pirro 2018: 443]. In his 
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analysis, Pirro points such a tendency related to the Five Star Movement. However, 
such a trend is apparent also for the League and Five Star Movement presented by the 
discourse of Matteo Salvini and Luigi Di Maio. For example, numerous far-right and 
far-left rhetoric is displayed in the announcements and vision for the EU from both 
party leaders, where one is coming with the “enemies of Europe” [Salvini: Juncker 
and Moscovici are ‘enemies of EU’ 2018] strategy for the current EU leaders, the 
other – with giving the diagnosis for the EU “to live only for six months” [Di Maio 
attacca (ancora) l’Ue: “Gli squali sentono il sangue e azzannano” 2018]. However, 
both of the leaders, in practice, contradict the “yellow-green” coalition agreement 
where the aim of the EU-Italy cooperation is based on the genuine respect of the EU 
institutions as well as EU partners.
So, the steps taken in order to take the country out of economic crisis prompted 
Italians to think about their political leaders as inactive and reluctant to deal ﬁrstly 
with national issues rather than European ones. At the same time, the “EU issue” 
provided the Italian small (and sometimes peripheral) political elites with the op-
portunity to gain control over the direction of the debate implementing their agenda.
M5S AND LEGA: WINNING RATIONALE
The elections in 2018 demonstrated that anti-establishment movements shaped 
the majority of the Italian mindset. M5S did not just become a leader but also got 
more than predicted by the exit polls. The right-wing radicals from Lega (Lega Nord) 
also obtained very good results. Together, these Eurosceptic parties receive more 
than half the votes in both houses of parliament. Instead, both traditional political 
forces failed. Moreover, the center-left wing of the ruling Democratic Party (PD), 
and the center-right Forza Italia, led by Silvio Berlusconi, received less than they 
had expected.
The politics in Italy is still weak due to the dissolution of innovation and political 
transformations to become the real Third Republic. The role of leadership in Italian 
politics was always crucial for determining how people’s choices shifted the interests 
of political parties. This time, the winning rationale was around two models of party 
organization in Italy – “the leader with the party” (case of Matteo Salvini and Lega) 
as well as “the party with the leader” (case of M5S, where a newly elected leader 
Luigi Di Maio was ﬁrstly unrecognizable for voters for maverick M5S).
Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle, M5S) is one of the front-runners of 
this year’s elections in Italy having left-wing ideological preferences. Established 
by a TV comedian Beppe Grillo and a web-developer and strategist Gianroberto 
Casaleggio, M5S became the ﬁrst anti-establishment party in Italy to form further 
the current government based on the discourse of the direct democracy [Bordignon, 
Ceccarini 2013: 691]. It criticizes the European Union for its inability to support 
Italy in the economic crisis as well as for social inequality that led to imbalances 
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in terms of providing aid to Italy. The M5S also provided its critics to the left-wing 
government led by Prime Ministers Renzi and Gentiloni. The party gained second 
place during the EP election in 2014 [EP results… 2014]. Some of the researchers in 
2014 continued to think that left-wing parties would be even strongly supported by 
the nation and win key mayoral seats in 2016 and 2017 even for those cities which 
were left-wing for decades [Segatti et al. 2015: 327–328]. Meanwhile, some other 
scholars indicate that M5S’ sentiments towards Euroscepticism imply its opposition 
to the EU austerity measure. At the same time, between 2014 and 2016, M5S claimed 
to be one of the most pro-EU party in Italy [Franzosi et al. 2015: 113].
The League (or Lega Nord (Northern League) till 2017) remains Italy’s far-right 
and still second-largest anti-establishment party. Representing somewhat Northern 
Italy constituency and being, as a result, traditionally anti-southern party, promoting 
secession of Gran Padania region, it made some major transformation under its leader 
Matteo Salvini. Lega refused its South-regional criticism, toughened its position to-
wards European integration and Eurozone and continued liaison with other far right 
populist parties in Europe [Longo 2016: 16]. Moreover, it crafted its narratives in 
such a way that even Southern Italians voted in favor of Lega due to the promises 
to ﬁnd responses to total insecurity, unsolved migration flows and populist concerns 
about loss of Italian identity due to the outcomes of globalization.1 
The reasons for the anti-establishment parties winning “hearts and minds” of 
Italians encompasses national and foreign challenges. The speciﬁcs of this year’s 
Eurosceptic winners consists in the fact that none of them wanted Italy to leave 
the EU. Also, even the most radical of them, Lega, removed from its program the 
narrative to be “all against all”. The two previously largest political parties, PD and 
Forza Italia, were generally considered pro-EU. However, even in their rhetoric, in 
particular in the PD program, it is possible to ﬁnd Eurosceptic narratives aimed at 
receiving more voters and their attention [Programma ed indicazione… 2018: 1–2]. 
Italian politicians mostly criticize policies inside the Eurozone, because they see that 
the euro currency does not help the Italians to overcome the 134% debt of GDP that 
Italy owes to the EU. Moreover, the World Bank data indicate that Italy’s economic 
development is one of the lowest in the EU (only 1.1%) [World Bank Report 2017].
It is necessary to do the mapping of the Italian parties according to their ide-
ology. We operate with the data provided by the Cattaneo Institute to present that 
M5S is relying on the left-wing political and populist logic, while Lega is a far-right 
populist party.
1 The policy of Lega was to close the majority of its ofﬁcial program documents to the researchers 
from Ukraine and to put them in the black list. The ban started to be in action since 2018. 
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Fig. 1. Position of the Italian parties in the political space
Source: Electoral compass for the 2018 Italian general elections [2018].
We are presenting our personal research of the political agenda before the elec-
tions. The key components for the populist logic are given in enlightening three 
areas: attitude towards the EU, economic challenges and migration issues (Table 1).
In the logic of the Lega program documents, the EU should be revised and 
changed in shape due to its excessive bureaucracy. The austerity measures introduced 
to Italy in 2011 and continued to have an impact on the Italians even in 2018, made 
a point present in the Lega program document that EU institutions should be revised 
[Programma elettorale. Programma di Lega. “Un Programma per l’Italia” 2018: 
4]. Moreover, it continues to be one of the points which populistically keep people 
voting for Lega in the regional and local elections continuing in 2018 and 2019.
Being supported by the major industrial group from the North of Italy, the logic of 
Lega is to encourage and facilitate doing business. Some of the steps in the program 
are presented in order to attract more young Italians into Lega. In this respect, the 
party engaged a lot of social media posts (if President Trump is the king of Twitter, 
Salvini is the king of Facebook).
At ﬁrst glance, the skepticism of M5S towards the EU is less evident. However, 
this party wants to focus on the measures to avoid the impact of the Eurozone on Italy 
taking into account the country’s indebtedness and the EU criteria restrictions for its 
member states. The primary focus is devoted to the social expenditures on traditional 
(for Southern Italy) aspects: trade unions, shortening of the working day, part-time 
job opportunities [Programma elettorale del Movimento 5 Stelle, 2018: 1–2].
Interestingly enough, the parties found common ground in terms of taking out 
Forza Italia and Silvio Berlusconi himself from the coalitioning on the point regarding 
the EU [Governo Salvini, addio per sempre… 2018]. Therefore, Berlusconi decided to 
follow his independent way towards the European parliamentary elections in May 2019.
THROUGH THE LENSES OF ITALY’S EUROSCEPTICISM OR A TALE FOR THE FUTURE… 91
However, both of the parties, Lega and M5S, are similar in interpreting migration 
challenge from the Italian perspective: from the issues of deporting illegal migrations 
presented by Lega to the distribution of asylum seekers across the EU, from the M5S. 
Both of the approaches were introduced in the coalition document from Lega and 
M5S and became a point of ﬁerce rhetoric from the EU and its partners.
In general, to summarize the points of the program from Lega and M5S, we 
present a generalized approach on the basis of the Ipsos, Istituto Cattaneo, EAP Hong 
Kong data as well as of personal interpretation.
Table 1. Who stands for what?
Party Europe Economy Migration
Lega
Revise treaties, refuse over-
regulation, no more austerity 
policies from Europe, protect 
big industrial groups
Facilitate credit lines for 
SMEs, help young people 
access labor market
Deport illegal migrants, take 
control of borders, Marshall 
Plan for Africa
M5S
Find alternatives to the euro, 
strike alliances with southern 
European countries, oppose 
austerity policies, protect 
“Made in Italy”
Free trade union representa-
tion, worker participation 
in decision-making, shorten 
working day, incentivize part-
time work
Revise the Dublin Regulation, 
distribute asylum seekers 
across the EU
PD  
(Democratic 
Party)
More European political and 
social integration
Reduce unemployment to 
under 9%, youth unemploy-
ment below 22%, guaranteed 
minimum wage, equal pay for 
women
No to the Dublin Regulation, 
stop aid for countries refusing 
to share burden
Source: Istituto Cattaneo, Ipsos, EAP Hong Kong and author’s own analysis.
At the same time, it is necessary to understand that public money was supposed 
not only to support the inequalities in private and public entities, balance for ex-
tensive tax evasion but also to manage social imbalances of all levels. Therefore, 
the EU is demanding to decrease Italy’s public debt which, according to Beda Ro-
mano, is, in fact, an attempt to influence Italy’s social order established after the 
Second World War. In fact, the political scientist stipulates that Brussels’ demand 
to stop the economic weaknesses led, in fact, to weakening Italy’s possibility to 
use its public debt. Moreover, Italy did not receive the opportunity to redistrib-
ute wealth as it happened for decades before, even not in the most efﬁcient way 
[Romano 2018: 2].
Secondly, the Italians are opposed to the migration policy of the EU under the 
leadership of Germany. In recent years, Italy has become the gateway to Europe 
for migrants of diverse national origin: every year, many African and Syrian ref-
ugees seek to cross the Mediterranean Sea and ﬁnd a better life in Italy and other 
EU countries. The majority of the migrants try to reach Europe from the African 
continent via a sea route from Libya to Italy. Italy remains one of the countries that 
are suffering from the majority of the refugees as a ﬁrst arrival country. The influx 
of migrants who have no right of entry and residence permits triggered political and 
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social responses by the government led by Letta, Renzi and Gentiloni [Attina’ 2017: 
167–168]. However, Italy did quite well in terms of saving lives at sea, but did not 
succeed in integrating migrants, which led to clashes in various cities and further 
disappointment of the PD-formed coalition government. In their electoral campaigns, 
Forza Italia raised concerns only about “social time bomb” that migrants represented 
for the Italian society, M5S insisted on closing the Italian borders for migrants, while 
PD presented the ways how to redistribute refugees to other EU countries.
Thirdly, in line with other populist parties, M5S and Lega touched the most of 
frustrated social groups: the young and the educated. Moreover, a very high youth 
unemployment rate in Italy explains the M5S protest vote [ISTAT 2017; Il Sole 24 
Ore 2018]. Recent ﬁgures of 31.9% of unemployed youth indicate that even in 2018 
Italy is in the top 3 with the highest youth unemployment rate together with Greece 
and Spain [Statista 2018]. The EU report on Employment and Social Developments 
in Europe (ESDE) indicates that one in ﬁve young Italians is neither employed nor 
in full-time study, putting Italy into the top countries within the NEET classiﬁcation 
(not engaged in education, employment or training) [ESDE 2017: 37–38].
Having a disadvantage regarding investments, means of social mobility, em-
ployment opportunities, and lodging, these “youngsters” would like to “count on 
something” to address the lack of access to the political decision-making of the parties 
that fail to perceive their demands and needs [Bonanomi et al. 2018: 184–186]. At 
the same time, only 35% of young Italians would like to go into details of “who is 
who” in Italian politics, while 40% are not interested in that issue at all. However, 
the presence of the new faces taking part in the campaign convinces those who 
are interested in voting in favor for M5S [La Rocca 2018]. Voicing dissatisfaction 
with Renzi–Gentiloni’s governance in 2016–2018 meets the expectations of young 
Italians, Lega also adapted its messages to attract more young people. Via the “2.0. 
communication” channels, Lega raised its youth support much more than it used 
to be in previous elections [Magnani 2018]. According to the agency Ipsos, it gave 
very positive results in terms of attracting more young people in favor of Lega after 
elections [Sondaggio Ipsos… 2018].
In general, it leads to a conclusion that Italian populism, presented by the new 
governing parties, voices dissatisfaction of young and the middle-aged Italians willing 
to see the changes in their regions and their businesses.
IN LINE WITH YELLOW-GREENERS: WHAT’S NEXT?
The long-awaited coalition of M5S and Lega turned out to be an interesting 
political experiment for Italy after almost three months of expectations during 
national March’s elections. M5S and Lega still disagree on many issues but they 
share their views in terms of placing responsibility on the European Union for 
Italy’s current position.
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Another Italian “yellow-green” government (with apolitically chosen but in fact 
“technical” prime minister) demonstrates the new “political techniques” for Italy: 
for the ﬁrst time, it breaks with the Italian tradition when the leader of the ruling or 
coalition party has always been the prime minister. This time, both leaders, from 
M5S and Lega did not want to compete each other and agreed to a neutral candidate, 
however, still nominated by the M5S. 
The Italian future is outlined in the 40-page “Italian Program of Change” which 
combines the slogans of the left and right directions. It refers to the closure of Roma 
camps, the strengthening of law enforcement and the protection of victims of crime, 
as required by the Lega demands. Instead, the content of the “leftist” provisions 
stands for increasing social beneﬁts and the abolition of the pension reform of 
2012, which raised the retirement age. At the same time, the Coalition “Program” 
presented the allegations to violate ﬁscal and ﬁnancial limits imposed by the EU for 
the Eurozone countries [Contratto per il governo del cambiamento 2018].
Concerning the EU affairs, the idea of the “yellow-green” government of Italy 
sounds like an attempt for a signiﬁcant reshuffle of European governance, in favor 
of bringing sovereignty back to Italy and, at the same time, effectively undermining 
the European integration. These new messages, which are about further lack of tol-
erance towards immigrants, the challenges of remaining in the Eurozone, etc., are 
likely to be found in every corner of Italy experiencing a high rate of unemployment, 
economic decline and societal insecurity [Longo 2016: 11].
The “yellow-green” government announced three social initiatives for 2019–
2021: the introduction of a minimum income for low-income citizens (the key pro-
gram idea of the Five Star Movement), a reduction in tax pressure, and a reduction 
in retirement age due to the abolition of the so-called “Fornero Law”, which raised 
the retirement age [Testo di Bilancio 2019 ufﬁciale: 11].
Also, although the negative balance of 2.4% of GDP does not exceed the Eu-
ropean norm of 3%, in a situation of excessive public debt, the European Commis-
sion demands from Rome a very conservative ﬁscal policy. In particular, the new 
government should reduce the budget deﬁcit by “cutting off” large-scale social 
expenditures from planned expenditures.
Moreover, here the Italians will have to think something much more creative 
than the “twine” policy between the populist position of the leaders of the M5S and 
the Lega, on the one hand, and the ﬁscal requirements of the Stability Pact, on the 
other, as the European Union requires.
It should be explained that Matteo Salvini, the newly appointed Minister of 
Interior of Italy who took ofﬁce just at the beginning of June, has already adopt-
ed a policy to block any foreign humanitarian boats coming to Italian ports. 
As a result, Italy started to have political tensions with France and the Nether-
lands. Salvini refused to give permission to dock for the ship Aquarius (June 
11, 2018) that had representatives of Doctors Without Borders (Médicins Sans 
Frontières) as well as other humanitarian organizations working with refugees 
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coming from Libya [Aquarius, cosa ha ditto il ministro Salvini nel suo intervento 
al Senato 2018].
In this regard, the Italian Republic itself advocated celebrating the 60th anniver-
sary of the signing of the Rome Treaties, which deﬁned European integration and 
contributed to the transitory way from being European Community to the European 
Union. The Rome Treaties became fundamental to the creation of the Europe of 
nations after the Second World War. They deﬁned the priority of the rule of law, 
democracy, and four freedoms: the free movement of people, capital, goods and 
services [Vdovychenko 2017: 18–19]. However, it is quite disputable whether such 
rhetoric will be supported by the “yellow-greeners” in the upcoming years. 
The unusual relation of M5S and Lega in forming a government creates new épo-
que, raising concerns also for the further European integration project. In particular, 
an alarm button presents Salvini’s program statements to substantially increase Lega’s 
presence and try to become a champion candidate in the European Parliament during 
the May 2019 elections. This recent episode nicely illustrates that the debate about the 
EU will be for the politicians to present “new verbal qualiﬁcations” if they want EU 
to continue its transformation, and not a decline process. So if Salvini succeeds, such 
an operation will generate the epochal change both in the international chessboard 
and in terms of the values and internal rules of the European Union.
CONCLUSIONS
Eurosceptic realities are not a new phenomenon in Italy but are successfully 
spreading over Italy where the new political parties efﬁciently channeled the social 
discontent of Italians. Across the country, the disenchantment with the EU mirrors the 
willingness to see new faces instead of the old political class. The migration crisis, 
high unemployment rate and a dwindling level of trust in Italy’s institutions were 
some of the most signiﬁcant barriers for the Italian “left-wing” parties to remain in 
power. The confrontation between “old parties” – Forza Italia, PD – and the rebranded 
or new ones – M5S and Lega – demonstrated the desire to have an active political 
elite. In this regard, Italy chose the line towards more populist and Eurosceptic 
parties at the same time. M5S and the Lega proposed highly exaggerated ideas but 
gave an impression of building a certain autonomy regarding the bureaucratic EU.
The attitudes towards the EU became a disputable issue in many of its member 
states. Being traditionally pro-EU, Italy is experiencing a decline in supporting the 
European integration process. On the governmental level, it is also being done by the 
new “yellow-green” government. We agree that the economic crisis in Italy and the 
austerity measures imposed both by the previous government run by the Democratic 
Party and supported by the EU, fostered the new Eurosceptic and fully populist par-
ties to come to power. Furthermore, we observed that the ideological orientation of 
the parties (whether it is a right-wing or left-wing) still keeps their EU-sceptic party 
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agenda. By analyzing the program documents and coalition agenda, we tried to prove 
that the Lega’s right-wing rhetoric is anchored in its more radical approach towards 
the EU. We concluded that such Lega’s modus operandi is caused by the willingness 
to keep the voters on track because the electoral campaigns in the Italian regions and 
provinces continue and Lega is also seriously preparing for the EU parliamentary 
elections. Meanwhile, Five Star Movement continues being Eurosceptic as well, but 
criticizes its institutional principles in comparison with Lega. We have to underline 
that the choice of only these two Italian parties was made due to one more aspect that 
they communicate in the Italian arena – a particular nationalistic approach addressing 
the EU. Further analysis and research are needed to empirically prove more traits of 
populism related to the new and old Italian parties in 2019.
After the Brexit referendum, Italy proved that EU member states embody differ-
ent approaches towards its future. Eurosceptic political actors prove to voice more 
and more nations with their asymmetric but still relevant to the hearts of the electorate 
messages. This process can provide a signiﬁcant impact on possible fundamental 
shifts in the European Parliament elections in May 2019. In such a way, the EU 
politicians will have to develop a simple taxonomy to categorize the arguments to 
remain pro-European.
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